Natural languages like English connect pronunciations with meanings. Linguistic pronunciations can be described in ways that relate them to our motor system (e.g., to the movement of our lips and tongue). But how do linguistic meanings relate to our nonlinguistic cognitive systems? As a case study, we defend an explicit proposal about the meaning of most by comparing it to the closely related more: whereas more expresses a comparison between two independent subsets, most expresses a subset–superset comparison. Six experiments with adults and children demonstrate that these subtle differences between their meanings influence how participants organize and interrogate their visual world. In otherwise identical situations, changing the word from most to more affects preferences for picture–sentence matching (experiments 1–2), scene creation (experiments 3–4), memory for visual features (experiment 5), and accuracy on speeded truth judgments (experiment 6). These effects support the idea that the meanings of more and most are mental representations that provide detailed instructions to conceptual systems.

Knowlton, T., T. Hunter, D. Odic, A. Wellwood, J. Halberda, P. Pietroski, J. Lidz. (2021). Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.

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I present a biased look at data relating to the form, meaning, understanding, and acquisition of comparative sentences with more. I highlight two major points: (i) comparatives provide a potentially unique case study for examining the interplay of current ideas in formal semantics, generative syntax, and cognitive psychology; (ii) we can give unified explanations for the otherwise disparate phenomena observed here only by interpreting our semantic theory along explicitly cognitive lines. The upshot is not so much a rejection of more traditional views as providing a window on their scientific limitations.

Wellwood, A. (2019). What more is. Philosophical Perspectives.

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Comparatives can invoke various dimensions for comparison, but not anything goes: more coffee invokes volume or weight, but not temperature, while more coffees invokes number, but not volume or weight. In general, the extant literature assumes that the difference between more coffee/coffees reflects a morphosyntactic ambiguity of more, such that it spells out MUCH-ER with bare nouns, and MANY-ER with plural nouns. Semantically, MUCH introduces a variable over measure functions, with constraints, whereas MANY introduces a cardinality function. I argue for an alternative, univocal theory based on the decomposition MUCH-ER, and account for the observed patterns of constrained variability by means of a stronger condition on the selection of measure functions than has previously been proposed.

Wellwood, A. (2018). Structure preservation in comparatives. Semantics and Linguistic Theory, 28.

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Comparative constructions like More people have been to Russia than I have are reported to be acceptable and meaningful by native speakers of English; yet, upon closer reflection, they are judged to be incoherent. This mismatch between initial perception and more considered judgment challenges the idea that we perceive sentences veridically, and interpret them fully. It is thus potentially revealing about the relationship between grammar and language processing. This paper presents the results of the first detailed investigation of these so-called 'comparative illusions'. We test four hypotheses about their source: a shallow syntactic parser, some type of repair by ellipsis, an incorrectly-resolved lexical ambiguity, or a persistent event comparison interpretation. Two formal acceptability studies show that speakers are most prone to the illusion when the matrix clause supports an event comparison reading. A verbatim recall task tests and finds evidence for such construals in speakers' recollections of the sentences. We suggest that this reflects speakers' entertaining an interpretation that is initially consistent with the sentence, but failing to notice when this interpretation becomes unavailable at the than-clause. In particular, semantic knowledge blinds people to an illicit operator-variable configuration in the syntax. Rather than illustrating processing in the absence of grammatical analysis, comparative illusions thus underscore the importance of syntactic and semantic rules in sentence processing.

Additional materials related to the published experiments and our preliminary experiments can be found on Github.

Wellwood, A., R. Pancheva, V. Hacquard, and C. Phillips. (2018). The anatomy of a comparative illusion. Journal of Semantics, 35(3).

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Semanticists often assume an ontology for natural language that includes not only ordinary objects, but also events, as well as other entities. We link this ontology to how speakers represent static and dynamic entities. Specifically, we test how speakers determine whether an entity counts as "atomic" by using count vs. mass (e.g., some gleebs, some gleeb) and distributive vs. non-distributive descriptions (e.g., gleeb every second or so, gleeb around a little). We then seek evidence for atomic representation in a non-linguistic task. Ultimately we suggest that natural language ontology reveals properties of language-independent conceptualization.

Wellwood, A., S. J. Hespos, and L. Rips. (2018). How similar are objects and events? Acta Linguistica.

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Beginning at least with Bach (1986), semanticists have suggested that the objects/events and substances/processes that nouns and verbs apply to are strongly parallel. We investigate whether these parallels can be understood to reflect a shared representational format in cognition, which in turn underlies aspects of the intuitive metaphysics of these categories. We hypothesized that a way of counting (atomicity) is necessary for object and event representations, unlike substance or process representations. Atomicity is strongly implied by plural language (some gorps, for novel gorp) but not mass language (some gorp). We investigate the language-perception interface across these domains using minimally different images and animations designed to encourage atomicity ('natural' spatial and temporal breaks), versus those that should not ('unnatural' breaks). Testing preference for matching such stimuli with mass or count syntax, our results support Bach’s analogy in perception, and highlight the formal role of atomicity in object and event representation.

Wellwood, A., S. J. Hespos, and L. Rips. (2018). The object : substance :: event : process analogy. In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2, Oxford University Press.

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Kotek et al. (2015) argue on the basis of novel experimental evidence that sentences like 'Most of the dots are blue' are ambiguous, i.e. have two distinct truth conditions. Kotek at al furthermore suggest that when their results are taken together with those of earlier work by Lidz et al. (2011), the overall picture that emerges casts doubt on the conclusions that Lidz et al. drew from their earlier results. We disagree with this characterization of the relationship between the two studies. Our main aim in this reply is to clarify the relationship as we see it. In our view, Kotek et al.'s central claims are simply logically independent of those of Lidz et al.: the former concern which truth condition(s) a certain kind of sentence has, while the latter concern the procedures that speakers choose for the purposes of determining whether a particular truth condition is satisfied in various scenes. The appearance of a conflict between the two studies stems from inattention to the distinction between questions about truth conditions and questions about verification procedures.

Hunter, T., J. Lidz, D. Odic, and A. Wellwood. (2017). On how verification tasks are related to verification procedures: a reply to Kotek et al. Natural Language Semantics, 25(2).

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Recent proposals in the semantics literature hold that the negative comparative less and negative adjectives like short in English are morphosyntactically complex, unlike their positive counterparts more and tall. For instance, the negative adjective short might decompose into little tall (Rullmann 1995; Heim 2006; Büring 2007; Heim 2008). Positing a silent little as part of adjectives like short correctly predicts that they are semantically opposite to tall; we seek evidence for this decomposition in language understanding in English and Polish. Our visual verification tasks compare processing of positive and negative comparatives with taller and shorter against that of arguably less symbolically-rich mathematical statements, A > B, B < A. We find that both language and math statements generally lead to monotonic increases in processing load along with the number of negative symbols (as predicted for language by e.g. Clark and Chase 1972). Our study is the first to examine the processing of the gradable predicates tall and short cross-linguistically, as well as in contrast to extensionally-equivalent, and putatively non-linguistic stimuli (cf. Deschamps et al. 2015 with quantificational determiners).

Tucker, D., B. Tomaszewicz and A. Wellwood. (2018). Decomposition and processing of negative adjectival comparatives. In The semantics of gradability, vagueness, and scale structure: Experimental perspectives, Cognition and Mind series.

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The event analysis is only rarely incorporated into degree-theoretic treatments of adjectival comparatives. I propose a neodavidsonian account of predications like Ann was happy that involves quantification over both states and events. This 'double-eventuality' analysis is motivated primarily by how stage-level gradable adjectives interact with temporal for-phrases in two classes of comparatives, which I differentiate as 'low' versus 'high' attachment of the comparative morpheme. Low attachment comparatives express canonical degree readings (more available), while high attachment involve comparing numbers of occasions (available more). I resolve these patterns by positing a stative core for adjectives, and the possibility of mapping properties of states to properties of events. Low attachment interpretations, then, involve comparison of states, and high involve comparison of (pluralities of) events. I show that the analysis extends to other cases where states and events can do work for adjectives outside of comparatives.

Wellwood, A. (2016). States and events for S-level gradable adjectives. Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26.

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How much meaning can a morpheme have? Syntactic and morphological analyses generally underdetermine when distinctions in meaning between two forms are due to (i) the presence of an additional syntactic head or to (ii) different information coded on the same head. Surveying patterns across hundreds of languages, Bobaljik (2012) hypothesizes that superlative forms universally consist of a comparative morpheme plus an additional superlative morpheme, e.g., tallest is underlyingly [ SUP [ CMPR [ TALL ] ] ]. Bobaljik's hypothesis includes, in part, a speculative proposal for a universal limit on the semantic complexity of morphemes. We offer a concrete basis for this proposal, the 'No Containment Condition' (NCC). The NCC is a constraint on grammars such that they cannot contain a certain semantic representation for a unitary head, if that representation can be constructed out of the semantic representations of two heads. Illustrating the proposal, we take Bobaljik's analysis of forms like tallest further, into [ [ [ CMPR SUP ] MUCH ] TALL ]. Based in semantic analysis, our suggestion introduces Bresnan's (1973) classical analysis of comparatives into the decomposition of superlatives.

Dunbar, E. and A. Wellwood. (2016). Addressing the two interface problem: comparatives and superlatives. Glossa.

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This paper explores the hypothesis that all comparative sentences—nominal, verbal, and adjectival—contain instances of a single morpheme that compositionally introduces degrees. This morpheme, sometimes pronounced much, semantically contributes a structure-preserving map from entities, events, or states, to their measures along various dimensions. A major goal of the paper is to argue that the differences in dimensionality observed across domains are a consequence of what is measured, as opposed to which expression introduces the measurement. The resulting theory has a number of interesting properties. It characterizes the notion of ‘measurement’ uniformly across comparative constructions, in terms of non-trivial structure preservation. It unifies the distinctions between mass/count nouns and atelic/telic verb phrases with that between gradable and non-gradable adjectives. Finally, it affords a uniform characterization of semantically anomalous comparisons across categories.

Wellwood, A. (2015). On the semantics of comparison across categories. Linguistics & Philosophy, 38(1).

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Determining the semantic content of sentences, and uncovering regularities between linguistic form and meaning, requires attending to both morphological and syntactic properties of a language with an eye to the notional categories that the various pieces of form express. In this dissertation, I investigate the morphosyntactic devices that English speakers (and speakers of other languages) can use to talk about comparisons between things: comparative sentences with, in English,more… than, as… as, too, enough, and others. I argue that a core component of all of these constructions is a unitary element expressing the concept of measurement.

The theory that I develop departs from the standard degree-theoretic analysis of the semantics of comparatives in three crucial respects: First, gradable adjectives do not (partially or wholly) denote measure functions; second, degrees are introduced compositionally; and three, the introduction of degrees arises uniformly from the semantics of the expression much. These ideas mark a return to the classic morphosyntactic analysis of comparatives found in Bresnan (1973), while incorporating and extending semantic insights of Schwarzschild (2002, 2006). Of major interest is how the dimensions for comparison observed across the panoply of comparative constructions vary, and these are analyzed as a consequence of what is measured (individuals, events, states, etc.), rather than which expressions invoke the measurement.

This shift in perspective leads to the observation of a number of regularities in the mapping between form and meaning that could not otherwise have been seen. First, the notion of measurement expressed across comparative constructions is familiar from some explications of that concept in measurement theory (e.g. Berka 1983). Second, the distinction between gradable and non-gradable adjectives is formally on a par with that between mass and count nouns, and between atelic and telic verb phrases. Third, comparatives are perceived to be acceptable if the domain for measurement is structured, and to be anamolous otherwise. Finally, elaborations of grammatical form reflexively affect which dimensions for comparison are available to interpretation.

Wellwood, A. (2014). Measuring Predicates. University of Maryland linguistics dissertation.

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Questions about the nature of the relationship between language and extralinguistic cognition are old, but only recently has a new view emerged that allows for the systematic investigation of claims about linguistic structure, based on how it is understood or utilized outside of the language system. Our paper represents a case study for this interaction in the domain of event semantics. We adopt a transparency thesis about the relationship between linguistic structure and extralinguistic cognition, investigating whether different lexico-syntactic structures can differentially recruit the visual causal percept. A prominent analysis of causative verbs like move suggests reference to two distinct events and a causal relationship between them, whereas non-causative verbs like push do not so refer. In our study, we present English speakers with simple scenes that either do or do not support the perception of a causal link, and manipulate (between subjects) a one-sentence instruction for the evaluation of the scene. Preliminary results suggest that competent speakers of English are more likely to judge causative constructions than non-causative constructions as true of a scene where causal features are present in the scene. Implications for a new approach to the investigation of linguistic meanings and future directions are discussed.

Vogel, C., A. Wellwood, R. Dudley, and J. B. Ritchie. (2013). Talking about causing events.The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication: Vol. 9.

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Bresnan (1973) posited that more is uniformly analyzed as much-er, whether it appears with adjectives (more intelligent, redder) or nouns (more soup). On the earliest degree-semantic analysis of such constructions, much appears but is semantically inert: it serves to morphologically mark the presence of the degree argument which is introduced by adjectives and nouns (Cresswell 1976). I present an alternative analysis, one suggested by Cresswell himself: on this account, the degree argument is introduced by much. I first show how the interpretation of this morpheme as a structure-preserving mapping to the domain of degrees is motivated by data from nominal and verbal comparatives, and then how it extends to adjectival comparatives. To accomplish this, I argue that adjectives express predicates of states, and interact with degrees only in composition with much. The upshot is a theory in which much universally provides the mapping to degrees for comparison by more, regardless of the syntactic category it combines with.

Wellwood, A. (2012). Back to basics: more is always much-er. Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 17.

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The question of whether epistemic modals contribute to the truth conditions of the sentences they appear in is a matter of active debate in the literature. Fueling this debate is the lack of consensus about the extent to which epistemics can appear in the scope of other operators. This corpus study investigates the distribution of epistemics in naturalistic data. Our results indicate that they do embed, supporting the view that they contribute semantic content. However, their distribution is limited, compared to that of other modals. This limited distribution seems to call for a nuanced account: while epistemics are semantically contentful, they may require special licensing conditions.

Additional material: Expanded Karttunen classification of question-embedding attitudes

V. Hacquard and A. Wellwood. (2012). Embedding epistemic modals in English: a corpus-based study. Semantics and Pragmatics, 5(4).

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This squib investigates parallels between nominal and verbal comparatives. Building on key insights of Hackl (2000) and Bale & Barner (2009), we show that more behaves uniformly when it combines with nominal and verbal predicates: (i) it cannot combine with singular count NPs or perfective telic VPs; (ii) grammatical properties of the predicates determine the scale of comparison—plural marked NPs and habitual VPs are compared on a scale of cardinality, whereas mass NPs and perfective (atelic) VPs are (often) compared along non-cardinal, though monotonic, scales. Taken together, our findings confirm and strengthen parallels that have independently been drawn between the nominal and verbal domains. In addition, our discussion and data, drawn from English, Spanish, and Bulgarian, suggest that the semantic contribution of more can be given a uniform analysis.

Wellwood, A., V. Hacquard, and R. Pancheva. (2012). Measuring and comparing individuals and events. Journal of Semantics, 29(2).

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Von Fintel and Iatridou (2003) observed a striking pattern of scopal noninteraction between phrases headed by strong quantifiers like every and epistemically interpreted modal auxiliaries. Tancredi (2007) and Huitink (2008) observed that von Fintel and Iatridou's proposed constraint, the Epistemic Containment Principle (ECP), does not apply uniformly: it does not apply to strong quantifiers headed by each. We consider the ECP effect in light of the differential behavior of each and every in the environment of wh-, negative, and generic operators as described by Beghelli and Stowell (1997). Assuming that epistemic and root modals merge at two different syntactic heights (e.g. Cinque 1999) and that modals may act as unselective binders (Heim 1982), we extend Beghelli and Stowell's topological approach to quantifier scope interactions in order to formulate a novel syntactic account of the ECP.

Gagnon, M. and A. Wellwood. (2011). Distributivity and modality: where each may go, every can't follow. Proceedings of Semantics and Linguistic Theory 21.

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Gagnon, M. and A. Wellwood. (2010). The typology of distributivity and epistemic containment phenomena. Proceedings of the Canadian Linguistics Association annual meeting.

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